Abstract. One source of complexity in the µ-calculus is its ability to specify an unbounded number of switches between universal (AX) and existential (EX) branching modes. We therefore study the problems of satisfiability, validity, model checking, and implication for the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus, in which only one branching mode is allowed. The universal fragment is rich enough to express most specifications of interest, and therefore improved algorithms are of practical importance. We show that while the satisfiability and validity problems become indeed simpler for the existential and universal fragments, this is, unfortunately, not the case for model checking and implication. We also show the corresponding results for the alternationfree fragment of the µ-calculus, where no alternations between least and greatest fixed points are allowed. Our results imply that efforts to find a polynomial-time model-checking algorithm for the µ-calculus can be replaced by efforts to find such an algorithm for the universal or existential fragment.
Introduction
In model checking, we reason about systems and their properties by reasoning about formal models of systems and formal specifications of the properties [5] . The algorithmic nature of model checking makes it fully automatic, convenient to use, and attractive to practitioners. At the same time, model checking is very sensitive to the size of the formal model of the system and the formal specification. Commercial verification tools need to cope with the exceedingly large state spaces that are present in real-life designs. One of the most important developments in this area is the discovery of symbolic methods [2, 27] . Typically, symbolic model-checking tools proceed by computing fixed-point expressions over the model's set of states. For example, to find the set of states from which a state satisfying some predicate p is reachable, the model checker starts with the set y of states in which p holds, and repeatedly adds to y the set EXy of states normal form, thus the strict syntactic fragments are also semantic fragmentsthere is no way of specifying an existential next in the universal fragment without negation, and vice versa. Both sublogics induce the state equivalence similarity (mutual simulation) [15] , as opposed to bisimilarity, which is induced by the full µ-calculus [16] . The existential and universal fragments of the µ-calculus subsume the existential and universal fragments of the branching-time logics CTL and CTL * . For temporal logics, the universal and existential fragments have been studied (see, e.g., [23] ). As we specify in the table in Figure 1 , the satisfiability, validity, and implication problems for the universal and existential fragments of CTL and CTL * are all easier than the corresponding problems for the full logics [9, 13, 23, 33] . On the other hand, the model-checking complexities for the universal and existential fragments of CTL and CTL ⋆ coincide with the complexities of the full logics, and the same holds for the system complexities of model checking (i.e., the complexities in terms of the size of the model, assuming the specification is fixed. Since the model is typically much bigger than the specification, system complexity is important) [4, 24] .
In contrast to CTL and CTL ⋆ , it is possible to express in the µ-calculus unbounded switching of AX and EX modalities. Such an unbounded switching is an apparent source of complexity. For example, the µ-calculus can express the reachability problem on And-Or graphs, which is PTIME-complete, while the reachability problem on plain graphs (existential reachability), and its universal counterpart, are NLOGSPACE-complete. Accordingly, the system complexity of the model-checking problem for the µ-calculus is PTIME-complete, whereas the one for CTL and CTL ⋆ is only NLOGSPACE-complete [12, 17, 24] . By removing the switching of modalities from the µ-calculus, one may hope that the algorithms for the four decision problems, and model checking in particular, will become simpler. Since most specifications assert what a system must or must not do in all possible futures, the universal fragment of the µ-calculus is expressive enough to capture most specifications of interest. Also, the problem of checking symbolically whether a model contains a computation that satisfies an LTL formula is reduced to model checking of an existential µ-calculus formula. Hence, our study is not only of theoretical interest -efficient algorithms for the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus are of practical interest.
We determine the complexities of the four decision problems for the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus, as well as for the corresponding alternation-free fragments. Our results are summarized in Figure 1 . All the complexities in the figure, except for the NP∩co-NP result for MC, ∃MC , and ∀MC model checking are tight. It turns out that the hope to obtain simpler algorithms for the universal and existential fragments is only partially fulfilled. We show that while the satisfiability and validity problems become easier for the existential and universal fragments, both the model-checking and implication problems stay as hard as for the full µ-calculus (or its alternation-free fragment). In particular, our results imply that efforts to find a polynomial time model-checking algorithm for the µ-calculus can be replaced by efforts to find polynomial time model-checking algorithms for the universal or existential fragment. Note that ⋆ PSPACE PSPACE EXPSPACE PSPACE NLOGSPACE CTL EXPTIME EXPTIME EXPTIME PTIME (linear) NLOGSPACE ∀CTL PSPACE co-NP PSPACE PTIME (linear) NLOGSPACE ∃CTL NP PSPACE PSPACE PTIME (linear) NLOGSPACE MC EXPTIME EXPTIME EXPTIME NP ∩ co-NP PTIME ∀MC PSPACE co-NP EXPTIME NP ∩ co-NP PTIME ∃MC NP PSPACE EXPTIME NP ∩ co-NP PTIME AFMC EXPTIME EXPTIME EXPTIME PTIME (linear) PTIME ∀AFMC PSPACE co-NP EXPTIME PTIME (linear) PTIME ∃AFMC NP PSPACE EXPTIME PTIME (linear) PTIME
Fig. 1. Summary of known and new (in italics) results
One key insight concerns the size of models for the existential and universal fragments of the µ-calculus. We prove that the satisfiability problem for the existential fragment of µ-calculus is in NP via a linear-size model property. This is in contrast to the full µ-calculus, which has only an exponential-size model property [22] . This shows that extending propositional logic by the EX modality and fixed-point quantifiers does not make the satisfiability problem harder. On the other hand, a similar extension with AX results in a logic for which the linear-size model property does not hold, and whose satisfiability problem is PSPACE-complete.
A second insight is that, in model-checking as well as implication problems, the switching of EX and AX modalities can be encoded by the boolean connectives ∨ and ∧ in combination with either one of the two modalities and fixed-point quantifiers. Let us be more precise. The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus is closely related to the problem of determining the winner in games on And-Or graphs. The system complexity of µ-calculus model checking is PTIME-hard, because a µ-calculus formula of a fixed size can specify an unbounded number of switches between universal and existential branching modes. In particular, the formula µy.(t ∨ EXAXy) specifies winning for And-Or reachability games, and formulas with alternations between least and greatest fixed-point quantifiers can specify winning for And-Or parity games. One would therefore suspect that the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus, in which no switching between branching modes is possible, might not be sufficiently strong to specify And-Or reachability. Indeed, in [11] the authors define a fragment L 2 of the µ-calculus which explicitly bounds the number of switches between both AX and EX modalities and ∧ and ∨ boolean operators. This fragment is as expressive as extended CTL ⋆ [11] , and it cannot specify reachability in And-Or graphs (the system complexity of model checking is NLOGSPACEcomplete). However, in model checking as well as implication problems, we can consider models in which the successors of a state are labeled in a way that enables the specification to directly refer to them. Then, it is possible to replace the existential next modality by a disjunction over all successors, and it is possible to replace the universal next modality by a conjunction that refers to each successor. More specifically, if we can guarantee that the successors of a state with branching degree two are labeled by l (left) and r (right), then the existential next formula EXy can be replaced by AX(l → y) ∨ AX(r → y), and the universal next formula AXy can be replaced by EX(l ∧ y) ∧ EX(r ∧ y). While these observations are technically simple, they enable us to solve the open problems regarding the complexity of the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus.
Propositional µ-Calculus
The propositional µ-calculus (M C, for short) is a propositional modal logic augmented with least and greatest fixed-point quantifiers [21] . Specifically, we consider a µ-calculus where formulas are constructed from Boolean propositions with Boolean connectives, the temporal modalities EX and AX, as well as least (µ) and greatest (ν) fixed-point quantifiers. We assume without loss of generality that µ-calculus formulas are written in positive normal form (negation is applied only to atomic propositions). Formally, given a set AP of atomic propositions and a set V of variables, a µ-calculus formula is either:
-true, false, p, or ¬p, for p ∈ AP ; -y, for y ∈ V ; -ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 or ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 , where ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are µ-calculus formulas; -AXϕ or EXϕ, where ϕ is a µ-calculus formula; -µy.ϕ or νy.ϕ, where y ∈ V and ϕ is a µ-calculus formula.
We say that the variable y is bound in µy.ϕ and νy.ϕ. A variable is free if it is not bound. A sentence is a formula that contains no free variables. We refer to AX and EX as the universal and existential next modalities, respectively. For a µ-calculus formula ϕ, define the size |ϕ| of ϕ as the size of the DAG representation of ϕ.
The universal µ-calculus (∀MC , for short) is the fragment of the µ-calculus in which the only next modality allowed is the universal one. Dually, the existential µ-calculus (∃MC , for short) is the fragment in which the only next modality allowed is the existential one. Note that since µ-calculus formulas are written in positive normal form, there is no way to specify existential next in ∀MC by negating universal next.
A µ-calculus formula is alternation-free if, for all y ∈ V , there are respectively no occurrences of ν (µ) on any syntactic path from an occurrence of µy (νy) to an occurrence of y. For example, the formula µx.(p ∨ µy.(x ∨ EXy)) is alternationfree, and the formula νx.µy.((p ∧ x) ∨ EXy) is not. The alternation-free µ-calculus (AFMC , for short) is the subset of the µ-calculus that contains only the alternation-free formulas. We also refer to the universal and existential fragments of AFMC , and denote them by ∀AFMC and ∃AFMC , respectively.
A µ-calculus formula is guarded if for all y ∈ V , all occurrences of y that are in a scope of a fixed-point quantifier λ ∈ {µ, ν} are also in a scope of a next modality which is itself in the scope of λ. For example, the formula µy.(p∨EXy) is guarded, and the formula EXµy.(p ∨ y) is not. We assume that all µ-calculus formulas are guarded. As proved in [24] , every µ-calculus formula can be linearly translated to an equivalent guarded one, thus we do not lose generality with our assumption.
The semantics of µ-calculus formulas is defined with respect to Kripke structures. A Kripke structure K = AP, W, R, w 0 , L consists of a set AP of atomic propositions, a set W of states, a total transition relation R ⊆ W × W , an initial state w 0 ∈ W , and a labeling L : W → 2 AP that maps each state to the set of atomic propositions true in that state.
Given a Kripke structure K = AP, W, R, w 0 , L and a set {y 1 , . . . , y n } of free variables, a valuation V :
W is an assignment of subsets of W to the variables in {y 1 , . . . , y n }. For a valuation V, a variable y, and a set
A formula ϕ with atomic propositions from AP and free variables {y 1 , . . . , y n } is interpreted over the structure K as a mapping ϕ K from valuations to 2 W . Thus, ϕ K (V) denotes the set of states that satisfy ϕ under the valuation V. The mapping ϕ K is defined inductively as follows:
By the Knaster-Tarski theorem, the required fixed-points always exist. For a sentence, no valuation is required. For a state w ∈ W of the Kripke structure K, and a sentence ϕ, we write K, w |= ϕ iff w ∈ ϕ K .
Satisfiability and Validity
The satisfiability problem for a µ-calculus sentence ϕ is to decide whether there is a Kripke structure K and a state w in it such that K, w |= ϕ. The validity problem is to decide whether K, w |= ϕ for all K and w. Note that ϕ is satisfiable iff ¬ϕ is not valid. The satisfiability and validity problems for µ-calculus and its alternation-free fragment are EXPTIME-complete [1, 13] . In this section we study the satisfiability and validity problems for the universal and existential fragments. For a ∀MC formula ϕ, let [ϕ] denote the linear-time µ-calculus formula [21] obtained from ϕ by omitting all its universal path quantifiers. It is easy to see that ϕ is satisfiable iff [ϕ] is satisfiable. Indeed, a model for [ϕ] is also a model for ϕ, and each path in a model for ϕ is a model for [ϕ] . Since the satisfiability problem for the linear-time µ-calculus and its alternation-free fragment is PSPACE-complete [32] , so is the satisfiability problem for ∀MC and ∀AFMC . Theorem 1. The satisfiability problem for ∀MC and ∀AFMC is PSPACEcomplete.
Since both ∃MC and ∃AFMC subsume propositional logic, the satisfiability problem for these logics is clearly hard for NP. We show that the satisfiability problem is in fact NP-complete. To show membership in NP, we prove a linearsize model property for ∃MC . Proof. The proof is similar to the one used in [23] to show a linear-size model property for ∃CTL. We proceed by induction on the structure of ∃MC formulas. With each ∃MC formula ϕ, we associate a set S ϕ of models (Kripke structures) that satisfy ϕ. We define S ϕ by structural induction. The states of the models in S ϕ are labeled by both the atomic propositions and the variables free in ϕ. We use S ϕ1 → S ϕ2 to denote the set of models obtained by taking a model M 1 from S ϕ1 , a model M 2 from S ϕ2 , adding a transition from the initial state of M 1 to the initial state of M 2 , and fixing the initial state to be the one of M 1 . We use S ϕ1 ∩ * S ϕ2 to denote the set of models obtained by taking a model M 1 from S ϕ1 and a model M 2 from S ϕ2 , such that M 1 and M 2 agree on the labeling of their initial states, fixing the initial state to be the initial state of M 1 , redirecting transitions to the initial state of M 2 into the initial state of M 1 , and adding transitions from the initial state of M 1 to all the successors of the initial state of M 2 . Finally, we use S ϕ(#) ↓, where # is an atomic proposition not in AP , to denote the set of models obtained from a model in S ϕ(#) by adding transitions from states labeled by # to all the successors of the initial state, and removing # from the labels of states. We can now define S ϕ as follows. Note that we do not consider the case where ϕ = x, for x ∈ V , as we assume that ϕ is a sentence.
-S true is the set of all one-state models over AP . -S false = ∅.
-S p , for p ∈ AP , is the set of all one-state models over AP in which p holds. -S ¬p , for ¬p ∈ AP , is the set of all one-state models over AP in which p does not hold.
For example, if AP = {p}, and ϕ = νx.ϕ 1 (x) with
, and S ϕ contains the two models obtained from the model M 1 described in the figure below by labeling the initial state by either p or ¬p. Also, if AP = {p, q} and ϕ = EXp ∧ (µy.q ∨ (p ∧ EXy)), then S ϕ contains the models obtained from the models M 2 and M 3 described below by completing labels of p or q that are left unspecified.
The models in S ϕ are "economical" with respect to states that are required for satisfaction of formulas that refer to the strict future. For example, the initial state of models in S EXϕ1 has a single successor that satisfies ϕ 1 , and models in S µy.ϕ(y) that do not satisfy ϕ(false) in the initial state, are required to satisfy ϕ(false) in a successor state.
It is not hard to prove, by induction on the structure of ϕ, that each model in S ϕ has O(|ϕ|) states and O(|ϕ|) transitions. We now prove, by an induction on the structure of ϕ, the following two claims.
1. For every model M ∈ S ϕ , we have that M satisfies ϕ. 2. For every model M that satisfies ϕ, there is a model M ′ ∈ S ϕ such that M and M ′ agree on the labeling of their initial states.
Note that Claim (2) implies that if ϕ is satisfiable, then S ϕ is not empty. Thus, the two claims together imply that if ϕ is satisfiable, then it has a satisfying model in S ϕ , which is guaranteed to be of size linear in |ϕ|.
The proof for ϕ of the form true, false, p, ¬p, ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 , and ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 is easy. For the other cases, we proceed as follows.
Let ϕ = EXϕ 1 . By the induction hypothesis, all models in S ϕ1 satisfy ϕ 1 . Hence, (1) follows immediately from the definition of S ϕ . To see (2) , consider a model M that satisfies ϕ. Since S true is the set of all one-state models over AP , it contains a model M ′ that agrees with M on the labeling of their initial states. Let ϕ = µx.ϕ 1 (x). By the semantics of µ-calculus, a model that satisfies ϕ 1 (ϕ 1 (false)), satisfies ϕ as well. Hence, (1) follows immediately from the definition of S ϕ . To see (2) 
′ is a model of ϕ 1 (ϕ 1 (false)), and agrees with M in the labeling of the initial states.
Let ϕ = νx.ϕ 1 (x). By the semantics of µ-calculus, a model M satisfies ϕ iff M satisfies ϕ i 1 (true), for all i ≥ 0. Consider a model M ∈ S ϕ . By the definition of S ϕ , the model M satisfies ϕ 1 (true), and the states attributed # satisfy ϕ 1 (true) as well. Since ϕ 1 (true) is existential, the states attributed # continue to satisfy ϕ 1 (true) after the new edges are added. In fact, it is not hard to see that after the new edges are added, the states attributed # also satisfy ϕ 1 (#). Thus, for all i ≥ 1, the model M can be unfolded (i − 1) times to show M satisfies ϕ i 1 (true), and we are done. To see (2) , let M be a model of ϕ and let # be a proposition not in AP . Then, M satisfies ϕ 1 (ϕ 1 (true)), and it can be attributed by # to satisfy ϕ 1 (# ∧ ϕ(true)). As in the previous case, since ϕ is guarded, we can ensure that this leaves the labeling of the initial state unchanged, possibly after unwinding a self loop in the initial state. In addition, adding transitions from states attributed by # to all successors of the initial state, leaves the label of the initial state unchanged, and thus results in a model in S ϕ that agrees with M on the labeling of their initial states.
⊓ ⊔
Note that the µ-calculus with both universal and existential next modalities has only an exponential-size model property (there is a µ-calculus sentence ϕ such that the smallest Kripke structure that satisfies ϕ is of size exponential in |ϕ|). Thus, the linear-size model property crucially depends on the fact that the only next modality that is allowed is the existential one. The linear-size model theorem shows that the satisfiability problem for ∃MC and ∃AFMC is in NP.
Theorem 2. The satisfiability problem for ∃MC and ∃AFMC is NP-complete.
Since a formula ϕ is satisfiable iff ¬ϕ is valid, and since negating an ∃MC formula results in a ∀MC formula and vice versa, the following theorem is an immediate corollary of Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 3. The validity problem is co-NP-complete for ∀MC and ∀AFMC , and is PSPACE-complete for ∃MC and ∃AFMC .
The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus is to decide, given a Kripke structure K and a µ-calculus formula ϕ, the set of states in K that satisfy ϕ. In this section we study the model-checking problem for the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus. We show that in contrast to the case of satisfiability, the model-checking problem for the restricted fragments is not easier than the model-checking problem for the µ-calculus, and the same is true for the alternation-free fragments.
The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus is closely related to the problem of determining the winner in games on And-Or graphs. We first review here some definitions that will be used in the reduction of the model-checking problem for the full µ-calculus to the model-checking problem for the fragments. A twoplayer game graph is a directed graph G = V, E , with a partition V e ∪ V u of V . The game is played between two players, player 1 and player 2. A position of the game is a vertex v ∈ V . At each step of the game, if the current position v is in V e , then player 1 chooses the next position among the vertices in {w | v, w ∈ E}. Similarly, if v ∈ V u , then player 2 chooses the next position among the vertices in {w | v, w ∈ E}. The game continues for an infinite number of steps, and induces an infinite path π ∈ V ω . The winner of the game depends on different conditions we can specify on words in V ω . The simplest game is reachability. Then, the winning condition is some vertex t ∈ V , and player 1 wins the game if π eventually reaches the vertex t. Otherwise, player 2 wins. A richer game is parity. In parity games, there is a function C : V → {0, . . . , k − 1} that maps each vertex to a color in {0, . . . , k − 1}. Player 1 wins the parity game if the maximal color that repeats in π infinitely often is even.
A strategy for player 1 is a function ξ 1 : V * × V e → V such that for all u ∈ V * and v ∈ V e , we have ξ 1 (u · v) ∈ {w | v, w ∈ E}. A strategy for player 2 is defined similarly, as ξ 2 : V * × V u → V . For a vertex s ∈ V , and strategies ξ 1 and ξ 2 for player 1 and player 2, respectively, the outcome of ξ 1 and ξ 2 from s, denoted π(ξ 1 , ξ 2 )(s), is the trace v 0 , v 1 , . . . ∈ V ω such that v 0 = s and for all
Finally, a vertex s ∈ V is winning for player 1 if there is a strategy ξ 1 of player 1 such that for all strategies ξ 2 of player 2, the outcome π(ξ 1 , ξ 2 )(s) is winning for player 1. When G has an initial state s, we say that player 1 wins the game on G if s is winning for player 1 in G.
We start by considering the system complexity of the model-checking problem for the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus; that is, the complexity of the problem in terms of the model, assuming the formula is fixed. As discussed in Section 1, the system complexity of AFMC model checking is PTIME-complete, and hardness in PTIME [17] crucially depends on the fact that an AFMC formula of a fixed size can specify an unbounded number of switches between universal and existential branching modes. As we prove in Theorem 4 below, the setting of model checking enables us to trade an unbounded number of switches between universal and existential branching modes by an unbounded number of switches between disjunctions and conjunctions. The idea is that in model checking, unlike in satisfiability, we can consider models in which the successors of a state are labeled in a way that enables the formula to directly refer to them. Then, it is possible to replace the existential next modality by a disjunction over all successors, and it is possible to replace the universal next modality by a conjunction that refers to each successor.
Theorem 4. The complexity and system complexity of ∀AFMC (so, also of ∃AFMC ) model checking is PTIME-complete.
Proof. Membership in PTIME follows from the linear time algorithm for AFMC [6] . For hardness, we reduce the problem of deciding a winner in a reachability game to model checking of a ∀AFMC formula of a fixed size. Since one can model check a specification ϕ by checking ¬ϕ and negating the result, the same lower bound holds for ∃AFMC .
Deciding reachability in two-player games is known to be PTIME-hard already for acyclic graphs with branching degree two, where universal and existential vertices alternate, and both s and t are in V e [14] . Given a bipartite and acyclic game graph G = V, E with branching degree two, a partition of V to V e and V u , and two vertices s and t in V e , we construct a Kripke structure K = AP, W, R, w 0 , L and a formula in ∀AFMC such that K, w 0 |= ϕ iff player 1 wins the reachability game on G from state s and with target t.
We do the proof in two steps. First, we transform the graph G to another graph G ′ , with some helpful properties, and then we construct the Kripke structure K from G ′ . Essentially, in G ′ each universal vertex is a left or right successor of exactly one existential vertex. Formally,
, and V ′ u and E ′ are defined as follows. Let E e = E ∩ (V e × V u ) and E u = E ∩ (V u × V e ). Recall that each vertex in V e has two successors. Let E e = E l e ∪E r e be a partition of E e so that for each v ∈ V e , one successor v l of v is such that v, v l ∈ E l e and the other successor v r of v is such that v, v r ∈ E r e . Note that a vertex u may be the left successor of some vertex w 1 and the right successor of some other vertex w 2 ; thus E l e (w 1 , u) and E r e (w 2 , u). The goal of G ′ is to prevent such cases.
e . Thus, each edge w, v ∈ E e contributes one vertex (v, l, w) or (v, r, w) to V ′ u . Intuitively, visits to the vertex (v, l, w) correspond to visits to v in which it has been reached by following the left branch of w, and similarly for (v, r, w) and right.
The size of G ′ is linear in the size of G. Indeed
It is not hard to see that player 1 can win the game in G iff he can win in G ′ . Note that the branching degree of G ′ remains two. The construction of G ′ ensures that the two successors of an existential vertex v can be referred to unambiguously as the left or the right successor of v.
The graph G ′ = V ′ , E ′ , together with s and t, induces the Kripke structure K = AP, V ′ , E ′ , s, L described below. The set of atomic propositions AP = {t, l}. For readability, we also introduce the shorthand r for ¬l.The proposition t holds in (and only in) the state t, and the propositions l and r hold in the left and right successor respectively for an existential node. Thus l ∈ L( v, l, w ) and r ∈ L( v, r, w ). Finally, let ϕ be the ∀AFMC formula µy.t ∨ (AX(¬l ∨ AXy) ∨ AX(¬r ∨ AXy)). It is now easy to see that player 1 can win the reachability game for t from s in
Theorem 5. The model-checking problem for ∀MC (so, also for ∃MC ) is as hard as the model-checking problem for the µ-calculus.
Proof. The idea is similar to the proof of Theorem 4, only that instead of talking about winning a reachability game, we talk about winning a parity game [10] , to which and from which µ-calculus model checking can be reduced [11] . Without loss of generality, we assume that existential and universal vertices alternate (the game graph is bipartite), and each node has exactly two successors. We also assume that each vertex in V u has the same color as the incoming existential nodes (otherwise, we can duplicate nodes and get an equivalent game with this property). We assume that each vertex of G is labeled by the color C(v), thus we can refer to G as a Kripke structure with AP = {0, . . . , k − 1}: the proposition i holds at vertex v iff C(v) = i. From [10] , player 1 wins the parity game G at an existential vertex s ∈ V e iff
where λ n = ν if n is even, and λ n = µ if n is odd. The formula above uses both universal and existential next modalities. By transforming G to a Kripke structure K as in the proof of Theorem 4, we can use left and right labels to vertices in the graph and use only one type of branching mode. Formally, let K be the Kripke structure induced by G. Then, player 1 wins the parity game in G at a node s iff
If the syntax of the µ-calculus is equipped with next modalities parameterized by action labels, then the above result follows immediately, because there is no distinction between existential and universal next modalities. Our proof shows that the result follows even if no such labeling is available.
Implication
The implication problem for a logic asks if one specification logically implies another specification; formally, given formulas ϕ and ψ of the logic, if the formula ϕ → ψ is valid. It arises naturally in modular verification [23, 28] , where the antecedent of the implication is the assumption about the behavior of a component's environment, and the consequent is a guarantee about the behavior of the component. For logics closed under negation, the implication problem is equivalent to validity: a formula ϕ is valid iff true → ϕ. Thus, the implication problem for the µ-calculus is EXPTIME-complete. However, for the existential and universal fragments of the µ-calculus, this is not the case: the implication problem combines both universal and existential formulas, and is more general than satisfiability or validity.
Theorem 6. The implication problem for ∃MC and ∃AFMC (so, also for ∀MC and ∀AFMC ) is EXPTIME-complete.
Proof. For formulas ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 of ∃MC , we have that ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 iff the formula ϕ 1 ∧¬ϕ 2 is not satisfiable. Membership in EXPTIME follows from the complexity of the satisfiability problem for the µ-calculus. Note that ¬ϕ 2 is a formula of ∀MC , thus we cannot apply the results of Section 3.
To prove hardness in EXPTIME, we do a reduction from the satisfiability problem of AFMC , proved to be EXPTIME-hard in [13] . Given an AFMC formula ψ, we construct a formula ϕ A of ∀AFMC and a formula ϕ E of ∃AFMC such that the conjunction ϕ = ϕ E ∧ ϕ A is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable. For simplicity, we assume that ψ is satisfied iff it is satisfied in a tree of branching degree two. Note that while our assumption does not hold for all AFMC formulas, the EXPTIME-hardness of the satisfiability problem for AFMC holds already for such formulas, which is sufficiently good for our goal here.
Intuitively, the formula ϕ E would require the states of models of ϕ to be attributed by directions so that at least one successor is labeled by l and at least one successor is labeled by r. In addition, ϕ A would contain a conjunct that requires each state to be labeled by at most one direction. Thus, states that are labeled by l cannot be labeled by r, and vice versa. Then, the other conjunct of ϕ A is obtained from ψ by replacing an existential next modality by a disjunction over the successors of a state.
Formally, the formula ϕ E = νy.EX(l ∧ y) ∧ EX(r ∧ y) requires each state (except for the initial state) to have at least two successors, labeled by different directions, and the formula ϕ 1 A = νy.((¬l) ∨ (¬r)) ∧ AXy requires each state to be labeled by at most one direction.
Then, the formula ϕ 2 A is obtained from ψ by replacing a subformula of the form EXθ by the formula AX(r ∨ θ) ∨ AX(l ∨ θ). We show that for every ψ such that ψ is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable in a model of branching degree two, we have that ψ is satisfiable iff
A is satisfiable. First, if ψ is satisfiable, then there is a tree of branching degree two that satisfies it. This tree can be attributed with l and r so that it satisfies the formula ϕ E ∧ ϕ A guarantees that each state of M has at least one successor that is not labeled l and at least one successor that is not labeled r. Accordingly, each subformula of the form AX(r ∨ θ) ∨ AX(l ∨ θ) is satisfied in a state w of M iff w has a successor that satisfies θ, thus w satisfies EXθ. Hence, the model M also satisfies ψ.
⊓ ⊔
The above proof constructs, given a formula ϕ of the µ-calculus, two formulas ϕ E and ϕ A such that ϕ E is an existential formula, ϕ A is a universal formula, and ϕ is satisfiable iff ϕ E ∧ ϕ A is satisfiable. However, one cannot in general construct formulas ϕ E and ϕ A such that ϕ E ∧ ϕ A is equivalent to ϕ. This can be proved considering two states of a Kripke structure that are similar, but not bisimilar, and the formula of µ-calculus that distinguishes them.
Note that the implication problem for ∀CTL ⋆ and ∃CTL ⋆ is EXPSPACEcomplete [23] , and hence easier than the satisfiability problem for CTL ⋆ , which is 2EXPTIME-complete. The above construction does not work for ∃CTL ⋆ , as the formula ϕ E used to label the states of a model by directions specifies an unbounded number of unfoldings of the structure. On the other hand, the number of unfoldings expressible by an ∃CTL ⋆ formula is bounded by the size of the formula; thus, the formula ϕ E does not have an equivalent formula in ∃CTL ⋆ .
Discussion
We studied the complexity of the satisfiability, validity, model-checking, and implication problems for the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus and its alternation-free fragment. We proved that the linear-size model property, which is known for ∃CTL, holds also for ∃MC . Interestingly, the property does not hold for ∃CTL ⋆ , which is less expressive than ∃MC . Thus, the picture we obtain for ∃MC and ∃AFMC is different than the one known for ∃CTL ⋆ and ∃CTL. For the universal fragments ∀MC and ∀AFMC , the picture does agree with the one known for ∀CTL ⋆ and ∀CTL, and the complexity of the satisfiability problem coincides with the complexity of the linear-time versions of the logics (obtained by omitting all universal path quantifiers).
We showed how labeling of states with directions makes the model-checking and implication problems for the universal and existential fragments as hard as for the full logics. While such a labeling is straightforward in the case of model checking, it is not always possible for implication. Indeed, in the case of CTL ⋆ and CTL, formulas cannot specify a legal labeling, making the implication problem for ∀CTL ⋆ and ∃CTL ⋆ strictly easier than the implication problem for CTL ⋆ , and similarly for CTL. In contrast, we were able to label the directions legally using a ∀AFMC formula, making the implication problems for ∀MC and ∃MC as hard as the one for M C, and similarly for the alternation-free fragments. Another way to see the importance of the fixed-point quantifiers is to observe that the implication problems for Modal Logic (µ-calculus without fixed-point quantifiers) and its universal and existential fragments are co-NP-complete.
Finally, the equivalence problem for a logic asks, given formulas ϕ and ψ, if the formula ϕ ↔ ψ is valid. The equivalence problem for the µ-calculus is EXPTIME-complete, by easy reductions to and from satisfiability. This gives an EXPTIME upper bound for the equivalence problem for ∃MC and ∀MC .
By a reduction from satisfiability or validity (whichever is harder), we also get a PSPACE lower bound. However, the exact complexity for the equivalence problem for the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus remains open (also for the alternation-free fragments).
The gap above highlights the difficulty in studying the universal and existential fragments of the µ-calculus. It is easy to see that in all formalisms that are closed under complementation (in particular, full M C), equivalence is as hard as satisfiability. Indeed, ϕ and ψ are equivalent iff (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) is not satisfiable. When a formalism is not closed under complementation, equivalence is not harder than implication, and is not easier than satisfiability or validity, whichever is harder. In the case of CTL, for example, it is easy to see that the equivalence problems for ∀CTL and ∃CTL are PSPACE-complete, as implication has the same complexity as satisfiability or validity (whichever is harder). The same holds for word automata: if we identify the existential fragment with nondeterministic automata, and the universal fragment with universal automata, then in both cases the language-containment problem (the automata-theoretic counterpart of implication) has the same complexity as the harder one of the nonemptiness and universality problems (the automata-theoretic counterparts of satisfiability and validity). Once we do not allow fixed-point quantifiers, the same holds for the µ-calculus: the equivalence problem for Modal Logic and its universal and existential fragments is co-NP-complete, as the co-NP-hardness of the implication problem applies already for the validity problem. So, in all the cases we know, except for the universal and existential fragments of CTL ⋆ and the µ-calculus and its alternation-free fragment, the above immediate upper and lower bounds do not induce a gap, and the exact complexity of the equivalence problem is known.
